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“There is no need of legislation so long as things work well without it, but, 
when such good customs break down, legislation forthwith becomes 
necessary” (Machiavelli) 
 
“I decided law was the exact opposite of sex; even when it was good, it 
was lousy” (Zuckerman) 
 
The relationship between the distinct, but overlapping, spheres of law and 
industrial relations (IR) has been complicated in the context of regulating 
employment relations. This regulation derives from a number of sources (formal 
and informal) and the balance between these various sources is continuously 
changing.1 This, of course, reflects the reality that the employer-employee 
relationship itself is one that is constantly developing. Adding to the complexity is 
the fact that, in addition to the regular courts, there are a variety of specific 
institutions and tribunals that deal with claims relating to employment disputes. 
This article looks at some significant recent developments in both IR and the 
legal regulation of employment, and assesses how these have impacted, and 
might further impact, on the workings of two of the key employment tribunals, the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Labour Court.2   
 
                                                 
1
 Regan, “Sources and Institutions” in Employment Law (Regan ed, Tottel, Dublin, 2009), p 3. 
2
 We do not consider directly here some of the other significant institutions that deal with claims 
relating to employment disputes, such as the Rights Commissioner Service, the Equality Tribunal, 
the Labour Relations Commission, and so on. However, some of the general points made pertain 
to the institutional framework generally. 
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II. Voluntarism, the Law and Partnership 
The Irish system of IR, derived as it is from that of the UK, has traditionally been 
classified as “voluntarist”, meaning that there has been a preference for joint 
trade union and employer regulation of employment relations and the relative 
absence of legal intervention.3 Voluntarism is premised on freedom of contract, 
what Kahn-Freund referred to as the great “indispensible figment of the legal 
mind”,4 and freedom of association, whereby the employment relationship is 
essentially regulated by free collective bargaining between worker and employer 
representative groups. In such a model, there is no rejection of public 
intervention or labour law but the role of the State is seen to be primarily to 
provide a supportive framework for collective bargaining and the “principal 
purpose of labour law is to regulate, support and restrain the power of 
management and organised labour”.5 
 
However, recent years have seen much comment, both in Ireland and the UK, on 
the decline of the voluntarist model.6 Principally, this is because trade union 
density has dropped considerably in Ireland over the course of the last twenty 
                                                 
3
 The Irish “Anglo-Saxon” model can be contrasted, for example, with the “Roman-Germanic” 
model of France and Germany, where the state, through its labour laws, has an active and central 
role in labour market organisation; see Teague, ”Deliberative Governance and EU Social Policy” 
(2001) 7(1) European Journal of Industrial Relations 26. 
4
 Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (Stevens, London, 1977), p 18.  
5
 Ibid, p 4. 
6
 See, for example, Teague, “New Developments in Employment Dispute Resolution” (2005) 4 
LRC Rev 5; Redmond, “The Future of Labour Law” (2004) 1 IELJ 3; Colling, “What Space for 
Unions on the Floor of Rights? Trade Unions and the Enforcement of Statutory Individual 
Employment Rights” (2006) 35(2) Ind Law J 140; Brown et al, ‘”The Employment Contract: From 
Collective Procedures to Individual Rights” (2000) 38(4) British Journal of Industrial Relations 
611. However, it should be noted that the “decline of voluntarism” (like that of the virtue of the 
young) has been decried at various times over a long period; see (the illustratively titled) 
Hawkins, “The Decline of Voluntarism” (1971) 2(3) Industrial Relations Journal 24. 
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years and now stands at approximately 35 per cent (in the private sector, the 
figure is approximately 20 per cent).7 Many organisations (particularly in the 
service industries) do not engage in collective bargaining and do not recognise 
trade unions. Efforts by the trade union movement to persuade the legislature to 
introduce a mandatory recognition scheme along the lines of that in the UK have 
failed.8 The decline in trade union density and presence in the workplace has 
been accompanied by a corresponding decline in industrial action, prompting 
some to identify a new “individualism” amongst workers, which encompasses an 
ideological rejection of collective organisation and action.9  
 
At the same time, there are increasingly attempts by employers to individualise 
the employment relationship through the implementation of various Human 
Resource Management (HRM) techniques, which often seek to bypass trade 
unions and foster employee commitment to the enterprise.10  Growing antipathy, 
in some cases bordering on oppression, towards unions by some major 
employers has also been documented.11 In certain cases, employer attention has 
shifted to the establishment of non-union structures for employee representation 
at work and, indeed, a number of obligations exist on employers in non-union 
                                                 
7
 Sheehan, “Union Density Drops 10% in a Decade” (2005) 35 IRN 12. 
8
 Doherty, “Union Sundown? The Future of Collective Representation Rights in Irish Law” (2007) 
4 IELJ 96. 
9
 Beck, The Brave New World of Work (Polity, Cambridge, 2000); cf. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial 
Relations: Mobilisation, Collectivism and Long Waves. (Routeledge, London, 1998). 
10
 D’Art andTurner, (eds), Irish Employment Relations in the New Economy (Blackhall, Dublin, 
2002). 
11
 D'Art and Turner, “Union Recognition and Partnership at Work: A New Legitimacy for Irish 
Trade Unions?” (2005) 36(2) Industrial Relations Journal 121; O’Sullivan and Gunnigle, “Bearing 
All the Hallmarks of Oppression; Union Avoidance in Europe’s Largest Low-cost Airline” (2009) 
34(2) Labor Studies Journal 252. 
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settings to inform, and consult with, their workers. These derive, primarily, from 
requirements of EU law and include various duties to inform, consult and, in 
some cases, negotiate with employee representatives under the Employees 
(Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006; the Transnational 
Information and Consultation of Employees Act 1996; the Protection of 
Employment Act 1977 (as amended by the Protection of Employment Order 
1996);12 the Protection of Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and 
Related Matters) Act 2007; the European Communities (Protection of Employees 
on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003;13 and the Safety, Health and 
Welfare at Work Act 2005.14   
 
However, while trade union presence and influence at the workplace level has 
been on the wane, the union movement has found for itself a new and crucial 
role in socio-economic governance at national level. Since 1987 a series of 
tripartite social pacts have been concluded between the social partners (the 
State, unions, employers and some other representative interest groups) 
beginning with The Programme for National Recovery (PNR, 1987-1990) and 
encompassing most recently Towards 2016 (agreed in 2006; reviewed in 2008). 
The agreements focus mainly on issues of pay (particularly in the public sector), 
                                                 
12
 SI No. 370 of 1996. 
13
 SI No 131 of 2003. 
14
 With the exception of the 2006 Act, the obligations on employers are issue specific; this 
contrasts with the more general obligations under the 2006 Act, but particularly with traditional 
collective bargaining, which tends to encompass a variety of workplace concerns; see Doherty, 
“It's Good to Talk...Isn't It? Legislating for Information and Consultation in the Irish Workplace” 
(2008) 15 DULJ 120. 
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tax reform and a range of other socio-economic issues.15 For our purposes, what 
is significant is that, through partnership, a number of legislative measures have 
been agreed, which are then progressed through the normal legislative process; 
these include legislation on trade union bargaining rights, collective 
redundancies, the national minimum wage and employment rights compliance.16  
 
The result of these changes (or, depending on one’s perspective, a contributor to 
them) has been an explosion in the volume of employment legislation over the 
last 20 years or so.17 This has had, and will continue to have, significant 
implications for the workings of the employment tribunals and for those-
employers, employees, trade unions and lawyers- that frequent them. This article 
looks at the implications of the changing context of Irish IR, in particular the 
“juridification” of employment relations,18 for the operation of two of the key 
employment tribunals; the Employment Appeals Tribunal, established to deal 
primarily with individual claims, and the Labour Court, set up to deal primarily 
with collective matters. We look, in turn, at each institution in detail, before 
considering some of the key developments and challenges facing each. 
 
                                                 
15
 See Roche, “Social Partnership in Ireland and New Social Pacts” (2007) 46(3) Industrial 
Relations 395. 
16
 Respectively the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004, the Protection of 
Employment (Exceptional Collective Redundancies and Related Matters) Act 2007, the National 
Minimum Wage Act 2000 and the Employment Law Compliance Bill 2008. At the time of writing 
the latter has not yet been passed into law.  
17
 Teague and Thomas, for example, point to 16 major pieces of employment legislation enacted 
in the period 1990-2006 alone; Teague and Thomas, Employment Dispute Resolution and 
Standard Setting in the Republic of Ireland (LRC, Dublin, 2008), pp 14-15. This list is by no 
means exhaustive, as the authors do not include hugely important legislation like the Safety, 
Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. 
18
 Browne, The Juridification of the Employment Relationship (Avebury, Aldershot, 1994). 
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III. The Employment Appeals Tribunal  
The Tribunal was established under s 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 
and, up to 1977, was known as the Redundancy Appeals Tribunal. In 1977, 
under s 18 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, the name of the Tribunal was 
changed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT). The Tribunal was originally 
set up to adjudicate on disputes about redundancy between employees and 
employers and between employees or employers and the Minister for Labour 
(now the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment) or a Deciding Officer. 
The scope of the Tribunal was extended over the years and now it deals with 
disputes under a range of Acts.19 
 
The Tribunal is composed of a Chairman and 36 Vice-Chairmen and a panel of 
80 other members, 40 nominated by “an organisation representative of trade 
unions of workers” (the Irish Congress of Trade Unions-ICTU) and 40 by “a body 
or bodies” representative of employers.20 The Tribunal acts in Divisions, each 
consisting of either the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman and two other members, 
one drawn from the employers’ side of the panel and one from the trade union 
side.  
 
In some areas, the EAT has first instance jurisdiction. These include claims 
arising from the termination of the employment relationship under legislation 
                                                 
19
 Regan, op. cit, p 16. 
20
 Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 39(4). 
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relating to unfair dismissal,21 redundancy22 and minimum notice.23 The Tribunal 
is, however, also an appellate body, adjudicating on appeals from the 
recommendations or decisions of rights commissioners under various pieces of 
employment rights legislation.24 Unusually, claims for unfair dismissal can be 
made in the first instance either to the Tribunal25 or to a rights commissioner and 
in the latter case an appeal lies from the recommendation of a rights 
commissioner to the Tribunal.26 
 
In 2008, over 5,000 cases were referred to the Tribunal.27 The EAT’s annual 
report shows that the bulk of the Tribunal’s work continues to be (in descending 
order) complaints under the Unfair Dismissals legislation,28 claims under the 
Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts, and claims under the 
Redundancy Payments Acts.  
 
The essential purpose of the EAT is to offer a speedy, inexpensive and relatively 
informal means for the adjudication of employment rights disputes under the 
various pieces of legislation that come within the Tribunal’s scope. As a result, 
procedures before the EAT are not as formal as would be the case before a 
                                                 
21
 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 8(2). 
22
 Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 39(15). 
23
 Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, s 11(1). 
24
 See, for example, Payment of Wages Act 1991, s 7(1); Maternity Protection Act 1994, s 33(1) 
and Protection of Young Persons (Employment) Act 1996, a 19(2).. See, generally, Kerr, 
Employment Rights Legislation (2nd ed, Round Hall, Dublin, 2006). 
25
 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 8(2). 
26
 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 9(1). 
27
 EAT Annual Report, 2008 available at http://www.eatribunal.ie. This represents an increase of 
72 per cent on 2007. 
28
 The EAT estimates that 95 percent of its total workload in terms of actual “time spent on cases” 
at hearings relates to unfair dismissal claims; Teague and Thomas, op. cit. p 145. 
 9 
regular court.29 A party to an application may “appear and be heard in person or 
be represented by counsel or solicitor or by a representative of a trade union or 
by an employers’ association or, with the leave of the Tribunal, by any other 
person”.30 Any party to a case may have one or more representative(s) acting on 
his/her behalf. At the hearing, a party to an application may be invited to make an 
opening statement, call witnesses, cross-examine any witnesses called by any 
other party, give evidence on his/her own behalf and address the Tribunal at the 
close of the evidence.31 The Tribunal has power to take evidence on oath and 
may administer oaths to persons attending as witnesses.32 Penalties are 
prescribed by law for wilful and corrupt perjury by any person convicted in a court 
of law of wilfully giving false evidence or wilfully and corruptly swearing anything, 
which is false, at a hearing of the Tribunal.33 
 
Written determinations of the Tribunal are final and conclusive subject only to the 
appropriate avenue of legal appeal. So, for example, a determination of the 
Tribunal on any question referred to it under the Redundancy Payments Acts,34 
or the Minimum Notice legislation35 may be appealed by a dissatisfied party to 
the High Court on a point of law. A determination of the Tribunal under the Unfair 
Dismissals Acts may be appealed to the Circuit Court by a party within six weeks 
                                                 
29
 See, generally, Kerr and McGreal, “Practice and Procedure in Employment Law” in 
Employment Law (Regan ed, Tottel, Dublin, 2009), 
30
 Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968 (SI No. 24 of 1968). 
31
 ibid.  
32
 Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 39(17)(a). 
33
 Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 39(17)(b). 
34
 Redundancy Payments Act 1967, s 39(14). 
35
 Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973, s 11(2). 
 10 
from the date of service of the determination.36 Appeals to the Circuit Court are 
held de novo (that is, by way of a full re-hearing of the case). The Tribunal may 
not award costs against any party to an application except that where, in its 
opinion, a party has acted frivolously or vexatiously.37 Legal aid, under s 28(8) of 
the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 may only be granted in relation to court proceedings 
and, therefore, not before tribunals like the EAT. 
 
The EAT, therefore, has always dealt in the adjudication of claims involving 
individual workers, where it has had to make legally binding decisions that clearly 
impact on the rights and interests of both employers and workers. Nevertheless, 
the EAT is not a court of law. In 2007, an EAT Procedures Revision Working 
Group was established to consider best practice in improving the service the 
Tribunal provides to its client base. The Review Group reported in 2007 and 
identified a range of areas where improvements could be made to the Tribunal’s 
services.38 Key amongst its proposals is a recommendation that a preliminary 
process be introduced prior to the substantive hearing, which will streamline the 
process and allow maximum opportunity for settlement. This would take the form 
of a pre-examination of each case by a member of the Tribunal. It further 
recommended that the objective of the procedures should be to ensure that they 
are speedy, inexpensive, fair and, as far as possible, informal. Other 
recommendations include that the Tribunal be given power to issue “Consent 
                                                 
36
 Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993, s 11(1). 
37
 Regulation 19(2) Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968 (SI No. 24 of 
1968). 
38
 The report is available at: http://www.entemp.ie. 
 11 
Determinations”, i.e. to embody settlement agreements in a Tribunal 
determination thus rendering them enforceable in like manner to regular 
determinations of the Tribunal and that time-limits be harmonised across all the 
pieces of legislation providing for the reference of disputes to the EAT. 
 
A major criticism of the EAT, however, relates to it having become overly 
legalistic. 39  Teague and Thomas reported that approximately two-thirds of those 
appearing before the Tribunal in 2006 had legal representation.40 This is an 
ongoing issue as an excessive focus on legalistic procedures inevitably impedes 
the mission of the EAT to provide a speedy, fair, inexpensive and informal means 
for individuals to seek remedies for alleged infringements of their statutory rights. 
The Report of the EAT review group41 sums up the problem as follows: 
 
“the Tribunal has moved very substantially from the more informal 
inquisitorial model to a more long drawn out, over legalistic, adversarial, 
costly and, especially from the perspective of employees and unions, 
intimidating environment…it was never envisaged when the Tribunal was 
established that participation in what was supposed to be a relatively 
informal tribunal would frequently involve delays and adjournments and 
legal representation (counsel and solicitor) on both sides with court-like 
procedures (evidence on oath, examination, cross examination, re-
examination and the adoption of rules of evidence) becoming the norm…it 
puts employees, especially those without union representation, and 
smaller firms which cannot afford legal representation, at a distinct 
disadvantage. The frequent delays in hearings and the cost of legal 
representation mean that the redress options of reinstatement or 
reengagement become less practicable and the maximum permissible 
award of two years’ salary (subject to mitigation of loss) is eaten up in 
legal fees. It is a concern that over 70 per cent of successful claimants, 
according to EAT Annual Report data, feel the need to have legal 
                                                 
39
 See Browne, The Juridification of the Employment Relationship (Avebury, Aldershot, 1994). 
40
 Teague and Thomas, op. cit. p140. 
41
 Op. cit, p 3. 
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representation, the cost of which they must pay for from their own 
resources…” 
 
However, the report goes on to note that:42 
 
“the Tribunal is not bound to fully adopt court procedures or to strictly 
follow the rules of evidence in all cases… While the Tribunal has no 
mediation role under its procedures, it does encourage settlement 
between the parties where it sees that it might be achieved…”. 
 
It is interesting to compare, in light of the EAT Review Group report, an 
innovation under the equality legislation, which allows the Director of the Equality 
Tribunal, at any stage, with the consent of both parties, to appoint an equality 
mediation officer, if the Director feels the case might be resolved in this way.43 
This provision represents an attempt to encourage the wider usage of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) systems and procedures that can result in a speedier 
and less expensive resolution of the issues and puts the parties themselves 
(rather than an adjudicator) in control of the outcome. Importantly, since 2004, 
the Director has opted to assign all cases to mediation (in the absence of an 
express objection from either party) making mediation the “default option” in 
relation to claims under the equality legislation.44 Interestingly, Teague and 
Thomas note that, while parties have been increasingly represented by lawyers 
in the mediation process, this has not led to the process becoming over-legalistic 
                                                 
42
 ibid. p 4. 
43
 Employment Equality Act 1998, s 78 (as amended by ss 34 and 46 Equality Act 2004). 
44
 Teague and Thomas, op. cit. p111. 
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as “to date the Tribunal has encountered no problems resulting from the 
involvement of the legal community in the mediation process”.45 
 
The nature of the disputes with which the EAT must deal often involves the 
protection and vindication of important rights (particularly in cases of dismissal) 
and so it may not be surprising that the growth in employment legislation, the 
decline in trade union density and a more rights-based approach to the 
employment relationship has led to the growth of legalism at the Tribunal. 
However, the EAT must ensure that it does not become a “cold house” for 
litigants (on both sides) by approximating too closely a court of law. If it be 
otherwise, the very existence and continuing usefulness of such a tribunal must 
be called into question. We will explore these concerns further below.  
 
IV. The Labour Court 
While the EAT was set up primarily to deal with statutory claims by individuals in 
relation to redundancy and, later, unfair dismissals, the Labour Court was 
established for a very different purpose. The Labour Court was established under 
s 10 of the Industrial Relations Act 1946 for the purposes of dealing with 
industrial relations disputes, predominantly of a collective nature. The Labour 
Court is not a court of law, but operates primarily as an industrial relations 
tribunal hearing both sides in a case and then issuing a non-binding 
                                                 
45
 ibid. p 129. A number of other groups, including trade unions, employer representative bodies, 
citizen advice centres and advocacy groups, has also participated in the process on behalf of 
claimants and respondents.  
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recommendation setting out its opinion on the dispute and the terms on which it 
should be settled. The Court, however, has acquired many extra functions in 
recent years as a result of specific roles being assigned to it under various pieces 
of employment legislation, under which it can make legally binding 
determinations.  
 
The Labour Court consists of nine full-time members; a chairman, two deputy 
chairmen and six ordinary members, three of whom are employers' members, 
nominated by a “designated trade union of employers” (in practice the Irish 
Business and Employers’ Confederation-IBEC) and three of whom are workers' 
members, nominated by “an organisation representative of trade unions of 
workers” (in practice the ICTU).46 The Court usually operates in divisions, made 
up of the chairman or a deputy chairman, an employers' member and a workers' 
member.47 According to its mission statement the role of the Labour Court is to 
“"find a basis for real and substantial agreement through the provision of fast, 
fair, informal and inexpensive arrangements for the adjudication and resolution of 
trade disputes".48  
 
Importantly for this article, the Court’s primary role was traditionally seen to be in 
the industrial relations arena. The court has a role to investigate trade disputes 
under the Industrial Relations Acts 1946-2004. This includes the power to 
investigate a dispute referred by the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) at the 
                                                 
46
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, s 10(4) and Industrial Relations Act 1969, s 2. 
47




request of the parties to the dispute.49 The Court may be requested by the 
Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment to investigate trade disputes 
affecting the public interest, or to conduct an enquiry into a trade dispute of 
special importance and report on its findings.50 The Court also functions as an 
appellate forum in relation to rights commissioners' recommendations under the 
Industrial Relations Acts.51 The Court can establish Joint Labour Committees and 
decide on questions concerning their operation,52 register Joint Industrial 
Councils,53 register, vary and interpret employment agreements and investigate 
complaints of breaches of registered employment agreements.54 In relation to 
codes of practice, the Court can investigate complaints of breaches and give its 
opinion as to the interpretation of a code of practice made under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1990.55  
 
The Court has the power to investigate disputes and, significantly, issue legally 
binding determination under the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-
2004. This legislation represents a recent attempt to deal with disputes in 
workplaces where no collective bargaining mechanisms are present and where 
trade unions are not recognized for negotiating purposes. Under the Acts, an 
employer may be compelled to grant trade union representatives the right to 
represent members on workplace issues relating to pay, and terms and 
                                                 
49
 Industrial Relations Act 1990, s 46. 
50
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, s 24  and Industrial Relations Act 1990, s 38.. See also Kerr, The 
Trade Union and Industrial Relations Acts (3rd ed, Round Hall, Dublin, 2007) p 219. 
51
 Industrial Relations Act 1969, s 13(9).  
52
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, s 35.  
53
 Industrial Relations Act 1946, s 61. 
54
 Part III Industrial Relations Act 1946. 
55
 Industrial Relations Act 1990, s 43. 
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conditions of employment. The Labour Court can make a binding determination 
with regard to these matters, and to dispute resolution and disciplinary 
procedures, in the employment concerned but cannot provide for arrangements 
for collective bargaining.56  
 
Outside of its traditional sphere of collective employment relations, the Court now 
hears appeals of decisions and recommendations from equality officers under a 
variety of legislation including the Employment Equality Acts 1998-200857 and the 
Pensions Act 1990;58  and from rights commissioners' decisions under, for 
example,  s 17 of the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001, s 15 
of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 and s 29 of the 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005. In these cases, appeals are by 
way of re-hearing the entire case and the Labour Court can issue legally binding 
determinations.59  
 
We can see, therefore, that the Court increasingly has a significant role in 
relation to individual employment law disputes (although it is IR disputes that 
continue to make up the bulk of the Court’s workload).60 However, the fact that 
the Court must increasingly grapple with complex employment rights legislation 
and the fact that its decisions in many areas are now legally binding mean that, 
                                                 
56
 Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, section 6(2). 
57
 Employment Equality Act 1998, s 83. 
58
 Pensions Act 1990, s 77. 
59
 For a comprehensive list of the Court’s legislative functions see Regan, op. cit. pp 14-15. 
60
 890 out of 1179 referrals in 2008 related to IR disputes-see Labour Court Annual Report 2008 
available at http://www.labourcourt.ie. 
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similar to the EAT, concerns exist that the court will become overly legalistic.61 
Traditionally, while the Court has the power to take evidence on oath and require 
the production before it of persons or documents,62 hearings are generally held in 
an atmosphere of informality and the procedure is inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial. However, this informality has been thrown into some doubt by the 
decision in Ryanair v The Labour Court.63  
 
This case centred around a dispute involving the company and pilots represented 
by the Irish Airline Pilots Association (IALPA, a branch of the Irish Municipal 
Public and Civil Trade Union, IMPACT), under the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Acts 2001-2004. The Supreme Court was quite critical of the 
informal procedures adopted by the Labour Court when hearing the case, in 
particular, the fact that neither a single pilot nor any other employee of Ryanair 
was called by the union to give evidence. The Supreme Court held that the 
Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures, first, by permitting complete non-
disclosure of the identity of the persons on whose behalf the union was 
purporting to be acting and, secondly, by disbelieving the oral evidence of two 
senior management figures in Ryanair in the absence of hearing evidence from 
at least one relevant pilot who was an employee of Ryanair. The Labour Court 
                                                 
61
 The Labour Court, for example, has in recent years needed to make quite sophisticated 
referrals to the ECJ in relation to issues arising from Community law. Note that in Case C-268/06 
Impact v Minister of Agriculture [2008] 2 CMLR 1265 the ECJ held that national courts or tribunals 
(in this case, the Labour Court) were required to apply directly effective provisions of Community 
law even if they had not been given express jurisdiction to do so under domestic law. 
62
 Kerr and McGreal, op. cit. p 848. 
63
 [2007] 4 IR 199. See Connolly, “Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004-
Implications for Industrial Relations Law and Practice of the Supreme Court Decision in Ryanair v 
Labour Court and IMPACT” (2007) 4 IELJ 37; Doherty, 2007, op. cit.  
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had decided the issue against Ryanair to a large extent on foot of omissions in 
Ryanair documentation and on foot of a view put forward by the union that the 
company did not engage in collective bargaining; this, according to the Supreme 
Court, did not amount to sufficient evidence to justify the finding. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court was critical of what it referred to as the Labour Court’s “mindset”, 
which favoured the way particular expressions are used and particular activities 
are carried out by trade unions.64 
 
This aspect of the Supreme Court’s judgment is somewhat surprising. The 
Superior Courts have traditionally been quite deferential to the Labour Court’s 
expertise in relation to industrial affairs, as seen in another judgment dealing with 
the 2001-2004 Acts, Ashford Castle v SIPTU.65 There Clarke J. noted that the 
Labour Court was an administrative body which was required, when exercising 
its role under industrial relations legislation, to bring to bear its own expert view 
on the approach to take to the issues. He held that “a very high degree of 
deference indeed needs to be applied to decisions which involve the exercise by 
a statutory body, such as the Labour Court, of an expertise which this (High) 
Court does not have”.66 The Supreme Court’s criticism of the procedures adopted 
by the Labour Court will likely have the effect of encouraging a greater formality 
in respect of Labour Court hearings and encourage a further juridificiation of the 
                                                 
64
 [2007] 4 IR 199 at 215 per Geoghegan J. 
65
 [2007] 4 IR 70. 
66
 ibid. at 85. See also the decision in Calor Teoranta v Mc Carthy [2009] IEHC 139, where Clarke 
J noted that, while the High Court can scrutinise the extent to which the Labour Court considered 
all necessary matters and excluded from its consideration any matters that were not appropriate, 
it should not interfere with a legitimate and sustainable judgment of the facts based on a proper 
consideration of all relevant materials. 
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process. The Labour Court has already drawn up a list of the key issues that 
arise out of the judgment and has laid down a set of guidelines that it will follow in 
future hearings, stressing the need for a “best evidence” rule.67 As Kerr and 
McGreal point out, although the decision dealt with the Labour Court’s jurisdiction 
under the 2001-2004 Acts, there seems to be nothing to suggest that the 
Supreme Court’s comments would not apply equally to other employment 
tribunals and to the Labour Court when exercising other jurisdictions.68 
 
V. Where to Now? 
We have looked above at the changing context of industrial relations in Ireland 
(in particular, the weakening of voluntarism, the spread of the legal regulation of 
employment relations and the emergence of social partnership). We have also 
looked at the role and functions of two of the key employment tribunals and noted 
some of the challenges facing them and concerns expressed about their 
operation. In this section, we will attempt to draw together these themes in order 
to draw attention to some implications for, and make some tentative suggestions 
as to the future direction of, the EAT and the Labour Court.  
 
Complexity Now 
The defining feature of the Irish system of employment dispute resolution at 
present is complexity. The well-known example of a potential claim for unfair 
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(2007) 14 IRN. 
68
 Kerr and McGreal, op. cit. p 828. 
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dismissal illustrates this. Under s 15 of the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 (as 
amended), a claimant must choose between pursuing a claim for wrongful 
dismissal at common law or a statutory claim under the Act (“procedural 
election”).69 However, this is not the only decision to be made. While a statutory 
claim for dismissal, depending on the circumstances, can also be made under a 
number of other acts, relief can only be granted pursuant to one piece of 
legislation; see the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003;70 the 
Protection of Employees (Part-Time) Work Act 2001;71 the Employees (Provision 
of Information and Consultation) Act 2006;72  and the Employment Equality Act 
1998.73 Obviously, in a termination situation, the optimum route to choose is a 
hugely important tactical question. The employee will need to consider a range of 
factors including the existence of preconditions for taking a claim (particularly 
service periods); the potential remedies available; the cost and likely duration of 
taking the claim a particular tribunal; the burden of proving the claim; different 
procedural requirements of the tribunals (time-limits, evidential requirements); 
and so on.74  
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70
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71
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Thus, there is a real need to simplify a system which potentially allows a 
multiplicity of fora (which have different aims and purposes, approaches, 
histories, institutional competences, routes of appeal and are staffed by 
personnel with different backgrounds) to hear claims arising from the same set of 
circumstances, in the same workplace, involving the same parties. We will return 
to this below. However, a clear implication of such a complex system is that it is 
unlikely to be navigated successfully other than by (relatively experienced) 
lawyers.  
 
The First Thing We Do…Lets Kill All the Lawyers 
We have noted above in the context of the EAT and the Labour Court some of 
the concerns expressed in light of the further juridification of the employment 
tribunal system (in terms of both individual and collective grievances). These 
primarily relate to the adoption of court-like rules and procedures and the related 
cost and delay engendered by legal involvement in what was envisaged originally 
as a relatively informal, party-driven and party-controlled dispute resolution 
system. The difficult balance between the vindication of rights on the one hand, 
and speedy and inexpensive resolution of grievances on the other is by no 
means new, nor is it unique to the employment sphere. Nevertheless, it does 
have a distinct relevance there in the light of a statutory regime that established a 
very particular method of grievance resolution, which envisaged a lesser reliance 
on legal professionals than would be the case in other areas of legal regulation.  
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There is an amount of research in the employment sphere (given the typical 
situation of a fundamental inequality of arms between the parties) to suggest that 
greater legal involvement in the process results in many aggrieved workers being 
discouraged from processing claims at all. In the UK, it has been argued that 
“vast swathes of disputes go entirely without adjudication” and “estimates 
suggest that only 15–25 per cent of potential cases are pursued formally”.75 
Moreover, research in both Ireland and the UK has shown that claimants tend to 
reflect the core, rather than the vulnerable “peripheral” workforce; in the UK 
three-fifths of applicants are men, 90 per cent are white, nearly all applications 
(95 per cent) are brought by permanent employees, and the median length of 
service is over six years.76 The average employee involved in a case before the 
Irish EAT is more likely to be male (65 per cent of claimants) and Irish (88 per 
cent) with the average length of service being six years.77 
 
Hann and Teague report that the decline of the voluntarist system of employment 
relations means more and more people are turning to the statutory route to 
resolve alleged breaches of employment rights:  
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“As a result, an increasing range of employment relations problems are 
being resolved by or with reference to employment law. People are 
interacting with employment relations issues as legal subjects and not as 
members of a collective institution such as a trade union”.78  
 
The growth in references to the EAT  is a development that is running parallel to 
the decline in trade union density and industrial action; thus it appears that 
conflict at work has certainly not gone away but has become increasingly 
individualised. The individualised nature of such an approach, however, can be 
problematic. The decline of the workplace presence of trade unions and the 
failure of any robust, non-union structures to emerge has, arguably, left a 
“representation” gap in relation to the processing of employment grievances. 
While the merits or otherwise of unionisation can be debated, one of the primary 
functions of trade unions has traditionally been to diffuse individual rights across 
memberships; the outcome of a dispute does not end with one individual, but 
rather unions can be “an instrument in translating statute and case law into 
changed employment practice”.79 Otherwise, in the absence of a class-action 
type procedure, even where cases are brought and won, the impact of the law is 
often confined to the individual. 
 
A final point to note relates to the involvement of lawyers in “pure industrial 
relations matters”. As Mallon has pointed out, if lawyers increasingly appear 
before the Labour Court in relation to collective disputes (as the Ryanair decision 
suggests is likely), there is an increased likelihood that lawyers will become more 
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active in industrial relations matters more generally. This might result, for 
example, in legal involvement in the drafting and negotiating of collective 
agreements and subsequent arguments as to the legal enforceability of such 
agreements; a further juridification of employment relations and a seismic shift 
away from the traditional voluntarist, collective bargaining model.80 
 
Partnership, the Labour Court and the Law 
There are two final issues to be noted in relation to the role and remit of the 
employment tribunals and the changing context of employment regulation. The 
first relates to the role of social partnership. Although the future of the social 
partnership system as it has developed since 1987 is in doubt at the time of 
writing, following the refusal of the state and many (if not all) employers to honour 
the pay terms of the Towards 2016 Transitional Agreement agreed in late 2008, 
the process has had an important impact on the regulation of employment 
relations over the last two decades. First, the role of the Labour Court has, in 
some areas, been eclipsed by partnership institutions. This is, perhaps, most 
starkly the case in relation to the role of the National Implementation Body (NIB). 
The NIB is a highly unusual body, which is made up of high-level representatives 
of the social partners (in this case of the IBEC, the Construction Industry 
Federation and the ICTU) and which meets on an ad hoc basis to ensure the 
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delivery of the industrial stability and peace provisions of the partnership 
agreements. In recent years, the NIB has intervened in high-profile industrial 
disputes in relation to nurses, electricians, and airport workers (to name but a 
few).81 The concern that this somewhat ephemeral body was being seen by 
employers and unions as a sort of “court of last resort” and was resulting in the 
usurpation of the statutory functions of the Labour Court was reflected in clause 
1.19 of the Towards 2016 Transitional Agreement which stated that a protocol on 
the operation of the NIB should be devised to avoid the role of the Labour Court 
(and the LRC) being undermined.  Nevertheless, the mere presence of such a 
clause indicates the extent to which the original role of the Labour Court in the 
“promoting of harmonious relations” between employers and workers and the 
“settlement of trade disputes” has been increasingly compromised.  
 
However, the social partnership process has impacted on the Labour Court in 
other ways too. The Ryanair judgment, where the Supreme Court indicated 
significant discomfort with the scope of the 2001-2004 Acts, drew attention to the 
difficulties that can arise for the Court in operating legislation that derives from 
the partnership process. The right to bargain legislation arose as a compromise 
position arrived at during social partnership talks, where the social partners, in 
deciding not to go down the route of statutory trade union recognition, but at the 
same time moving away from a purely voluntarist approach,  agreed on a half-
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way house solution, which was ultimately shown to be highly problematic.82 
Similarly, the Labour Court, with its role as the promoter and defender of 
collective agreements, including national partnership agreements, now finds itself 
in the unenviable position of adjudicating on claims where trade unions are 
seeking to implement terms of the Towards 2016 Transitional Agreement from 
which the State and employer representative bodies have resiled. Whether or not 
the present system of partnership continues, then, will have important 
implications for the future remit of the Labour Court. 
 
A second issue relates to the composition of the employment tribunals. At 
present, as we have seen, the practice is for the State, the ICTU and the main 
employer representative bodies (primarily the IBEC) to appoint the members of 
the EAT and the Labour Court.  This system is likely to come under pressure on 
a number of fronts. First, if court-like rules and procedures (and, in the case of 
the Labour Court, statutory issues per se) are increasingly before the tribunals, 
the appropriateness of appointing non-lawyers to the tribunals is likely to be 
questioned. Secondly, the extent to which the existing social partners are, in fact, 
representative of their supposed constituencies is likely to become more of an 
issue. Most obviously, with trade union density at the low levels outlined above, 
whether the ICTU can really be said to be representative of “workers” is open to 
challenge. However, it is the status accorded the traditional employer 
representative bodies that has become a major source of recent controversy. 
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This can be seen in relation to recent challenges (which at the time of writing are 
awaiting High Court hearings) to the catering Joint Labour Committee, by the 
Quick Service Food Alliance, a new grouping of major fast food suppliers and a 
challenge to the electrical contracting Registered Employment Agreement by a 
non-aligned group of electrical contractors.83 In both cases, certain employers 
are objecting to terms and conditions imposed on them as a result of agreements 
or decisions made by the established employer representative groups. A failure 
to renew the social partnership process (which itself has been criticised for being 
non-representative)84 might lend further momentum to calls for an overhaul of the 
system of appointments to the employment tribunals.  
 
Conclusion 
The objectives behind setting up specialist employment tribunals were to provide 
a flexible, speedy and relatively informal means of resolving workplace disputes. 
What we have seen is that these objectives have become increasingly difficult to 
achieve. The increasing incidence of legal representation and the greater 
tendency towards the use of court-like practices and procedures seem difficult to 
avoid given the volume and increasing complexity of employment legislation. 
This point is amplified by evidence that shows significantly more successful 
outcomes for claimants that attend the EAT with the benefit legal 
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representation.85 Specialist tribunals now have a heavy burden of responsibility 
to resolve claims by reference to relevant legislation and case law, both domestic 
and European.86 Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that the system for 
resolution of employment grievances could be rationalised in order to make it 
more navigable for lawyers and non-lawyers alike. This might be achieved, for 
example, by the establishment of a single “Employment Court”, with uniform 
procedural rules and routes of appeal. Greater use of ADR mechanisms (as in 
the case of mediation in equality case) might be considered, as well as provision 
for some sort of financial assistance for impecunious claimants (funded, at least 
in part, by the social partners).87  
 
However, it seems to this author, a more fundamental change might be 
canvassed. This would involve an attempt to restore or revive the collectivist 
ethos of the system for employment dispute resolution. The role given to the 
Labour Court to support collective bargaining and to uphold and enforce 
collective agreements (including national partnership agreements) was 
underpinned by the view that such agreements are worthy of support precisely 
because they are agreed by the parties themselves. The voluntarist system was 
supported because it allowed the labour market actors to agree appropriate rules 
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and procedures for the orderly resolution of disputes (that could be tailored to 
individual sectors or workplaces) and allowed a flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances it was felt could not be matched by legislation.88 These features 
could be extremely attractive to all sides in times of economic difficulty.  
 
To achieve such an end would require, first, an institutional structure within which 
collective bargaining could take place and some form of State support for, and 
commitment to, such arrangements and, secondly, an acceptance by employers 
of an obligation to comply with the terms of a collective agreement (be it 
negotiated at establishment, sectoral or national level).89 This would surely 
require a reform of the laws relating to trade union bargaining rights and/or a 
more robust legislative framework for non-union workplace representative 
structures than is implicit in the Ryanair judgment (which veers towards a 
Constitutional stamp of approval for what are effectively “company unions” 
operated and controlled by the employer)90 or explicit in the weak implementation 
of the Information and Consultation Directive.91 This may, on the face of it, seem 
unpalatable to employers and unlikely in the context of an economic downturn, 
but the many positive achievements of a partnership approach in the 20 years to 
2007,92 the need for orderly restructuring of business (preferably without an 
upsurge in industrial action, the first signs of which are recently beginning to 
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emerge)93 and the potential benefits suggested by the literature of employee 
involvement and “voice” at work94 all suggest deeper consideration of this 
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